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I. ABSTRACT 
This paper utilizes a nine-period panel dataset and a first-difference equation to analyze 
to what extent state administered Earned Income Tax Credits to tax-filers impact the fertility 
rate among a state’s population. Utilizing data from the American Community Survey, the 
IRS, and the Center for Disease Control, changes in fertility rates are regressed upon a first-
difference model, which includes year fixed effects, that controls for changes in state-level 
variables such as household income, female education, female labor supply, changes in the 
amount of a state’s population receiving the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the average 
amount that each household receives through the state administered Earned Income Tax 
Credit. The study finds that the marginal effect of the state administered contributions to tax-
filers through a state’s Earned Income Tax Credit program does not have a significant effect 
on the state’s fertility rates. However, the model suggests that the number of households in a 
state’s population who receive benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit program has a 
negative effect on fertility rates. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a welfare program in the United States that has 
enjoyed the support of politicians of both major parties and academics alike. The program 
supplements income that workers earn by subsidizing their wages to incentivize workers to work 
more hours, even if their wages, salary, or commissions are otherwise relatively small. In the 
1960s, the negative income tax was a popular proposed solution to poverty, and the EITC was 
born from these debates (Ventry & Dennis 2000). This direct transfer welfare program requires 
little bureaucratic or administrative overhead compared to other means-tested welfare services, 
simply creating a program by which the Internal Revenue Service can transfer expenditures to 
families and individuals as they complete their taxes (Ventry & Dennis 2000). Direct cash 
transfers, like the EITC, are also popular among some who believe that recipients of welfare 
have the best understanding of how to allocate resources they need to thrive, rather than welfare 
programs that provide direct and specific services at a free or reduced cost (Ventry & Dennis 
2000).  
The Ford Administration enacted the Tax Reduction Act in 1975 which established the 
EITC to create a labor incentive for low to moderate-income workers, applied to wages, salaries, 
tips, commissions, and net earnings from self-employment including various other earned 
income sources. The EITC applies on an upward sloping scale as a household earns income, 
plateaus toward the middle of the qualifying income amount, and then slopes downward until the 
household income approaches the maximum eligible income. EITC dollars are tax credits and 
not deductions, which means that each dollar expended through the EITC reduces tax liability by 
exactly one dollar, rather than reducing one’s taxable income by one dollar. 
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In tax year 2018, the EITC for a four-person married household is available up until the 
household earns $54,884 (IRS 2018). The maximum benefit for this family would be $6,431 in 
refundable tax credits, meaning many families can expect to receive a lump sum of cash from 
their return if the credit is greater than the amount owed on their taxes. The program increases 
the labor supply of mothers and lifts millions of working families in the United States above the 
poverty line (Hoynes & Patel 2015). Since its inception, the federal government has expanded 
the Earned Income Tax Credit each decade, as recently as 2009. Governing bodies perceive the 
EITC as such a successful investment of public resources that twenty-nine states, plus 
Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico, have now created their own EITC which supplements the 
federal program. The state treasury runs the state administered programs by simply matching a 
portion of a tax-filer’s federal EITC receipt. Therefore, if a tax-filer lives in a state that 
contributes a 10% EITC match, and the tax-filer receives a $1,000 federal EITC, then the tax-
filer would receive an additional $100 through their state tax returns. In this paper, I examine the 
extent to which the additional amount provided by the state administered policy influences 
fertility rates. 
Since the EITC is the third largest federal welfare program, deferring over $66 billion in 
collected tax revenues, it is worth exploring whether it is a pro-natalist policy (IRS, Tax Policy 
Center 2018). A political narrative is present that families abuse welfare systems by having more 
children in order to receive larger benefits (Clawson et al 2000). Additionally, welfare programs 
that target low and moderate-income individuals and families that either encourage or discourage 
fertility decisions by women pose ethical questions regarding the proper role of welfare and anti-
poverty reduction. The prospect that government policy can impact the birth rates of its 
constituents is an important question, not only to understand the macroeconomic consequences, 
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but to provide social context in the discussion of how public policy should address economic 
inequality and poverty. While previous research has scrutinized the EITC for its effects on the 
labor supply of women and fertility rates, this paper focuses exclusively on the impact of the 
marginal increases in EITC payments supplied by state administered policy. 
This research investigates to what extent the marginal increase supplemented by state 
administered EITC policies have influenced the fertility rates of recipients. Utilizing a 
difference-in-difference model, the paper exploits variations in EITC match rates in various 
states, controlling for characteristics such as income, weekly hours worked, and education, 
across states from 2007-2016. The investigation reveals that the state administered EITCs do not 
appear to impact fertility rates, but that increases in a state’s population that qualifies for the 
program decrease fertility rates. 
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III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Most economic approaches toward studying fertility derive from two theoretical frameworks, 
the first presented in Becker (1960) and the second in Schultz (1973). Becker posits that children 
are normal goods. As incomes increase, so too does the demand for children. His model assumes 
that women and families decide to have children when they have access to the resources required 
to raise the child with a healthy upbringing in a safe home. The theory goes that people who have 
access to limited resources, considering the large expense that children incur, will decide to have 
fewer children. Those with access to many resources, or higher incomes, will prefer to raise more 
children for the fact that they can now afford them. As with all normal goods, increases in means 
cause increases in quantity demanded.  
Schultz refutes this and argues that while rising incomes may encourage women to raise 
more children since they can afford all the expenses of raising a child, women with higher 
incomes tend to also have a higher opportunity cost of time. This is compelling because raising 
children is not only expensive, it is also time consuming. Schultz believes that as women enter 
the workforce, a phenomenon that revolutionized the labor market and was well underway by the 
early 1970s, their value of time increases due to the increases in market value for their time. 
Schultz argues that women relegated to housework and considered unemployable (by social 
norms, structural inequalities, and legal restrictions) did not have a large opportunity cost 
because the labor market did not value their time. So, with all this time available, women 
productively allocated their time by raising children. As women integrated themselves into the 
labor market, the increased market value of their time overrode the effect of increased income on 
raising children. So, as incomes increase for women, they start to value their time spent working 
more relative to staying home to raise children.  
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Schultz also suggests that a primary reason women have children is to raise them so that they 
one day will take care of them, meaning that women are concerned not with merely having 
children, but with having children that survive. Infant mortality has dropped considerably across 
the world, including the United States in the 20th century. Schultz argues that infant mortality 
decreases reduce fertility rates. Women need not have as many children since a larger proportion 
of born children will survive. These theoretical arguments can inform our understanding of some 
of the factors that may influence trends in fertility rates. 
Literature on whether welfare policy can impact fertility has shown mixed results. Dyer & 
Fairlie (2004) find that family cap welfare reform, that stops benefits after a certain number of 
children live in the household, has no effect on the fertility rate of single, less-educated women. 
Similarly, Kearney (2004) studies whether family caps affect fertility, finding no significant 
effects. But Joyce et al (2004) find that women who are the most likely to use public assistance 
do give fewer births and have higher abortion rates after the implementation of family cap 
welfare reform. 
Different types of welfare incentives may affect fertility to varying degrees. Milligan (2005) 
finds that a cash transfer program available to Quebec families with children, with total 
payments nearing $8,000 CAD, led to a 25% increase in birthrates during the period of the 
program. Acs (1996) investigates whether a host of American welfare reforms instituted in the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s had impacts on fertility and finds that not one of the reforms had 
an impact on birth rates. However, Whittington, Alm, and Peters (1990) find that a $1,000 
increase in the personal exemption for federal tax deductions increases birthrates by 11 percent, 
impacting natality on middle income women more than low and high-income families. Similarly, 
Joyce, Kaestner, and Kwan (1998) conclude that Medicaid expansion in the early 1990s raised 
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the birthrate among White women by 5% but did not influence the fertility of Black women. 
Grogger and Bronars (2001) examine twins to determine if welfare incentives cause women to 
marry and have children sooner. They find that single, White women were marrying at an older 
age with high welfare benefits and that single, Black women were more likely to have children 
with higher welfare benefits. 
There is also robust literature on the EITC and its various effects on women, families, and 
children. For instance, Dahl and Lochner (2012) find that children of EITC recipients have 
greater educational achievement. They estimate that for each $1,000 increase in income among 
eligible families, children increase their standardized test scores by 6% of a standard 
deviation.  Additionally, EITC incentives impact the labor supply of single women. Eissa and 
Liebman (1996) find that the introduction of the EITC into the federal tax code in the late 1980s 
caused single women with children to increase their labor force participation by up to 2.8 
percentage points, but that women already in the labor force did not increase their hours worked. 
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) find that the EITC expansion in the early 1990s increased the 
labor supply of single mothers the most of several welfare and tax reforms in the same period. 
Eissa and Hoynes (2004) estimate that early 1990s expansions of the EITC caused a reduction in 
the total labor supply of married couples. While the labor supply of married men slightly 
increased, the decrease in labor supply participation of married women offset any increase in 
total labor supply increase from EITC-receiving households. 
There are a couple of studies related closely to the research question of this paper. Duchovny 
(2000) analyzes the EITC Expansion of 1990 to determine if it increased rates of fertility among 
groups of eligible women. Duchovny finds that married, White women and unmarried, non-
White women increased their fertility, and that the expansion led to a five percent increase in the 
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probability of having a second child for married, White women and a twenty percent increase for 
unmarried, non-White women. Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009) test whether the EITC 
expansions between 1990 and 1999 effected fertility rates and found that the tax credit only 
produced small reductions in fertility rates among White women. 
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IV. MODEL 
Equation 1: 
ΔBirthRateit= δ1d08t …δ916t + B1Δx1it-1…+ B3ΔxNit-1 + B4Δwit-2 + B5Δzit-2 + B6(Δwit-2*Δzit-2) + ϵit 
In this model, the subscript i’s refer to each individual state and the t’s refer to each 
individual year. The variable w refers to the average state EITC contribution per participating 
household, z refers to household participation rate (per 10,000 households), and x's are controlled 
characteristics. The variable of interest is the interaction term Δw*Δz, which combines the state’s 
EITC contribution with the number of households receiving the benefit. The model lags EITC 
amounts by two years because households make fertility decisions about one year before a birth 
and the IRS disburses EITCs following the tax year that households earn them. The model lags 
other control variables by one year. I employ year fixed effects to control for broad changes in 
economic and social characteristics that may have influenced fertility rates. 
This paper uses a first differenced estimation equation using a nine-period panel of state-
level data. The nine periods are the consecutive fiscal years between 2008 and 2016. This model 
will estimate the difference in fertility rates across states, exploiting the variations in the state’s 
annual per household EITC contributions. The model includes both states that do and do not 
have their own state-level administered EITC, although it does omit a handful states that have 
EITC programs. These omitted states have important and significant program policy variations 
that would make it impossible to estimate the amount of EITC paid out by each state’s 
government using the data used in this paper, such as changing the match-rate based on how 
many children are in a household, or implementing complicated phase-in/phase-out slopes, 
similar to the federal program design. 
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Employing a panel approach estimates the impacts on fertility rates while controlling for 
various other social and economic characteristics of each individual state. In other words, the 
model compares changes in fertility rates within each state, so the model controls for observed 
changes in fertility rates due to differentiated structural characteristics of states. The first-
difference model analyzes how changes in EITC are correlated with changes in fertility rates. In 
this way, the model accounts for structural differences in states whose fertility rates may be 
different due to unique economic and social characteristics. The change in fertility rate in each 
these states will be estimated as a function of the change in percentage of women that holds a 
high school degree or higher in each state, the change in median income of households in each 
state, the change in percentage of women working full-time in each state, the change in EITC 
participation rate in each state, and the change in the state-level EITC contribution in each state. 
States that employ a state-level EITC program will have positive or negative values, dependent 
on whether they increased or decreased the federal match rate each year and by how much the 
federal rate changes. In other words, if a state holds its match rate constant, but the federal 
government increases its EITC allocations, then the state will be expending an increase to the 
program recipient. The dataset reflects this increase. States that do not employ a state-level EITC 
program will have values of zero.  
The coefficient of interest in this paper is B6 which will estimate the impact of the 
implementation of the state level EITC on fertility rate, controlling for education, income, hours 
spent working, and for the saturation of EITC participants. The empirical approach of this paper 
is based upon the reviewed literature’s conclusions that economic factors impact rates of fertility. 
The literature also demonstrates that the EITC can affect fertility rates. This model attempts to 
exploit variation in state-level EITC expenditures to determine the extent to which marginal 
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increases in tax returns impacts household income. I hypothesize that, based upon the reviewed 
literature, that increases in the EITC at the state-level would produce small reductions in fertility 
rates. The EITC is a strong and positive labor supply incentive, and this nudge of encouragement 
for working women to take on additional hours of work will likely result in reductions in the 
rates of childbirth. Therefore, I would expect the B6 variable to be negative. 
However, it would not be surprising if the model produces statistically insignificant 
effects. The typical state-level contribution tends to range between $100 and $400 per year. This 
is certainly a sizeable receipt that could induce important changes in economic activity, but 
child-rearing is an expensive endeavor, in terms of physical and emotional labor, opportunity 
cost of time spent, as well as real dollar costs. The relatively small size of this tax expenditure 
compared to the total costs of raising a child could mean that state administered EITC programs 
do not meaningfully nudge fertility rates in any direction.  
Another important consideration that might attenuate any impact of this tax incentive 
would be the diffusion of information. Many tax-filers may be unaware of these programs 
immediately upon creation. Furthermore, it is not clear how long it may take tax-filers to respond 
to changes in the tax code. My approach assumes that they respond within the tax year of which 
they receive their first lump-sum payment when they finalize their returns. Tax-filers may take 
longer to respond to changes in their effective tax rate, but my assumptions are consistent with 
the existing literature on the subject.  
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V. DATA 
This research uses annual Census data from the American Community Survey, fertility data 
from the Center for Disease Control and Earned Income Tax Data from both the IRS and the 
National Bureau for Economic Research. I estimate State level EITC contributions by 
multiplying annual matching rates set by state governments and the average amount of federal 
benefit received by each household each year. I use median household income to control for 
fertility rate changes that could be attributed to other changes in household income which 
influences a household’s ability to access resources, healthcare, and childcare services and to 
control for broader macroeconomic trends in state’s that may affect household decision-making. 
Likewise, research suggesting that increases in the educational attainment of women negatively 
impacts fertility rate informed the decision to include educational data on women in the study. 
This data, also coming from the American Community Survey, controls for trends in women’s 
education that could be responsible for variations in fertility rates in each individual state during 
the period of study. 
The Census Bureau conducts the American Community Survey annually and provides state 
level data collected under a consistent methodology for the years of interest in this study, from 
2005-2016. Data for EITC participation comes from the IRS, presented by the Tax Policy 
Center, as well as the National Bureau for Economic Research. This data source is particularly 
valuable because it contains the entire population of program participants. In other words, the 
IRS data is not a sample of participants, thus, the data tells us about the program participation of 
the whole population. I collected data for tax years 2005-2016 in order to create a nine-period 
panel analysis during which I exploit variations between states’ and their EITC programs. I 
adjusted all nominal dollars provided by the American Community Survey, the IRS, and the 
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National Tax Policy Center (which this dataset uses for household median income and EITC 
receipts) to constant 2016 dollars. Fertility data comes from the Center for Disease Control and 
spans the period of study form 2005-2016. Fertility rates describe how many livebirths occur in 
each year per 1,000 women between the ages of 16 and 44 in a given state. 
The study uses the 2008-2016 period because of the lack of literature focused on recent data. 
The most updated EITC data from the Tax Policy Center is available only up to 2016. Most of 
the literature on EITC and fertility were published in the 1990s and early 2000s. Recently, the 
state administered EITC has grown in popularity among governing bodies. Since the year 2000, 
seventeen additional states have adopted their own EITC match to supplement the federal 
government program’s rebate rate. This paper builds upon investigations of the EITC and its 
effects on labor supply and fertility decisions, with updated data sources, a nationwide 
difference-in-difference approach, and an emphasis on exploiting the variations in the marginal 
increase of the tax credit dollars provided by the states. The study sample includes 44 states, 
omitting 7 states with EITC programs that feature policy complexities that would make them 
difficult to study- including features like different match rates for households of different sizes, 
or vigorously changing matching rates for different incomes. This study includes 19 total states 
that administer their own EITC program, and includes 25 states that do not, serving as a control 
to the treatment group. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
Summary Statistics – Figure 1 
 
States with EITC 
Variable Observations Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Fertility Rate 188 63.3 6.9 50.2 77 
 
Percentage of Households Receiving EITC 
 
188 
 
.17 
 
.04 
 
.10 
 
.28 
15 
 
 
Average State Expenditure per Household 
for EITC 
 
 
188 
 
330.1 
 
265.2 
 
81.8 
 
1169.9 
Percentage of Women with High School 
Degrees 
 
188 89.2 2.5 82.3 93.6 
Percentage of Women Working Full-Time 188 51.9 3.8 43.3 59.6 
 
Median Household Income 
 
188 
 
572734 
 
9071.6 
 
445623 
 
78987.1 
 
 
States without EITC 
 Variable Observations  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Fertility Rate 340 67.7 7.5 50.3 95.7 
Percentage of Households Receiving EITC 340 .19 .05 .10 .34 
Percentage of Women with High School 
Degrees 
 
340 87.7 3.7 78.8 94.3 
Percentage of Women Working Full-Time 340 51.1 3.9 40.8 60.5 
Median Household Income 340 54464 9186.4 38842.6 76705.5 
 
  
Table 1 depicts the summary statistics of the sample I used to regress the model. In 
addition to the extra year of observations for the first-difference model, the model I employ uses 
a two-year lag on both the EITC participation and benefit amount variables. This means that the 
model requires an additional two years of observations. So, while the study collected data form 
2005-2016, the specified model only scrutinizes years 2008-2016. These nine years across the 
forty-four states in the sample results in the smaller amount of observations in the regression 
results. 
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Regression results – Figure 2 
Change in 
Fertility Rate 
 Coef.  St. Err.  t-
value 
 p-value  [95% Conf. Interval]  Sig 
Difference in 
Percent of returns 
with EITC 2 Year 
Lag 
 
-22.393 7.73 -2.90 0.004 -37.550 -7.236 ** 
Difference in 
State EITC 
Contribution 2 
Year Lag 
 
0.000 0.001 -0.30 0.760 -0.001 0.011  
Difference in 
Female High 
School graduation 
percentage 1 Year 
Lag 
 
0.042 0.122 0.35 0.728 -0.197 0.282  
Difference in 
Female Full-time 
work % 1 Year 
Lag 
 
0.040 0.073 0.55 0.582 -0.103 0.184  
Difference in 
Household 
Median Income 
Real Dollars 1 
Year Lag 
 
0.000 0.000 -.19 0.847 -0.000 0.000  
 Difference in 
Percent of 
returns with 
EITC 2 Year 
Lag * Difference 
in State EITC 
Contribution 2 
Year Lag 
 
0.066 0.117 0.56 0.573 -0.165 0.298  
Mean dependent var -0.733 SD dependent var  1.218 
Overall r-squared  0.347 Number of obs   396.000 
F-test   17.464 Prob > F  0.000 
R-squared within .417 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 1058.549 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
The regression results displayed in Figure 2 show that the model explains 42% of the 
variations in birthrates among states during the sampled timed. This is not too surprising, since 
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fertility decisions are quite complex and economic factors are only one element that rational 
actors consider. The change in the EITC participation rates is the only variable that is statistically 
significant. This suggests that as a state experiences an increase in the number of households 
filing for the EITC, the live birth rate of women aged 16-44 drop. This measure is both 
statistically significant at the 95% level when using clustered standard errors. There are likely 
omitted variables that are heavily conflated with participation in the EITC program that could 
more accurately specify the effect of the program. However, the negative sign of the result is 
consistent with cited literature above that the EITC can elicit increases in labor supply and 
fertility rates among women and families.  
 However, the most important variable that this paper focuses on is the interaction variable 
between the number of households receiving the EITC and the size of the state administered 
deduction. This continuous-continuous interaction variable, while positive in sign, is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that the marginal impact of state administered EITC 
programs did not affect fertility rates among states between 2008-2016. However, due to the 
findings that increased EITC participation does effect fertility rates, I believe that this issue 
deserves further study. The regression demonstrates that the EITC does influence fertility rates 
which the previously existing literature supports. I believe a model that specifies changes in the 
demographics across states accounting for ages, ethnic identities, and religious practice may 
produce more significant results and I suggest further study. I also believe that states that choose 
to administer EITC programs do not do so randomly, that is that there are unobservable 
characteristics of these states that may be influencing fertility rates in one direction or another. 
To an extent, the first-difference model addresses this by controlling for individual state 
characteristics by analyzing only the changes in fertility rates in each state, but the decisions that 
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lawmakers make to become a treatment group could be correlated with other factors that my 
model misses. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The regression results suggest that the state administered EITC programs employed between 
2008 and 2016 did not have a statistically significant effect on fertility. In fact, all variations in 
state-level median income, female high school graduation rates and number of weekly hours 
worked by women were all statistically insignificant in estimating impact on fertility rates. The 
only variable with a statistically significant coefficient is the participation rate of the EITC 
program. I believe that this result is enough to suggest that there is more to learn from this 
research question. Previous literature suggests that the federal level EITC program effects both 
labor supply and fertility decisions among women in the United States, and with the introduction 
and expansion of state-level programs becoming more popular, this issue deserves further 
attention. 
To carry this research forward, I recommend studying individual level data rather than 
attempting to discern trends across fertility rates of entire state populations. Rather than assessing 
changes in fertility rates of all people, homing in on the fertility rates specifically of people that 
the EITC program are likely to impact could yield more accurate results. For instance, it is 
possible that a state experiences greater uptake in their EITC program while a significant share 
of their population sees large increases in their income. Perhaps the fertility rates of the high-
income families are dropping quickly, more quickly than any observable increase that could be 
happening among the low-income families of whom the child incentive of the EITC may impact. 
Likewise, the effect could be opposite, where a state sees more people receiving the tax credit 
while there is also an increase in households whose income is so low, they fail to qualify for the 
credit. Changes in the fertility rates of these extremely low-income households could be 
increasing more than an observable decrease among households that are receiving the tax credit. 
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Further study should address these issues by studying households as units of analyses rather than 
states, since the program of interest impacts roughly 10-15% of a state’s population at most. 
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IX. APPENDIX 
Earned Income Tax Credit State Level Summaries, for States with EITC – Figure 3 
State and Year 
Percent of Households 
receiving EITC 
State EITC 
Match Rate 
Average State EITC 
Payment to Household 
Colorado 
2005 12.7%   
2006 12.5%   
2007 12.3%   
2008 13.2%   
2009 15.2%   
2010 15.3%   
2011 15.4%   
2012 15.2%   
2013 15.3%   
2014 14.8%   
2015 14.4% 10.0% $219.09 
2016 13.9% 10.0% $215.20 
Connecticut 
2005 10.3%   
2006 10.3%   
2007 10.2%   
2008 10.9%   
2009 12.2%   
2010 12.1%   
2011 12.5% 30.0% $635.80 
2012 12.7% 30.0% $641.77 
2013 13.3% 25.0% $543.51 
2014 13.2% 27.5% $599.07 
2015 13.1% 27.5% $604.45 
2016 13.0% 27.5% $597.58 
Delaware 
2005 14.8% 20.0% $445.17 
2006 14.7% 20.0% $448.22 
2007 14.2% 20.0% $436.94 
2008 15.5% 20.0% $433.06 
2009 16.9% 20.0% $466.42 
2010 17.0% 20.0% $459.95 
2011 17.0% 20.0% $461.51 
2012 17.2% 20.0% $465.13 
2013 17.4% 20.0% $469.07 
2014 17.4% 20.0% $468.16 
2015 17.0% 20.0% $476.06 
2016 16.6% 20.0% $469.40 
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Illinois 
2005 15.1% 5.0% $116.28 
2006 15.0% 5.0% $118.16 
2007 14.4% 5.0% $116.08 
2008 15.6% 5.0% $115.86 
2009 17.2% 5.0% $123.78 
2010 17.3% 5.0% $122.43 
2011 17.4% 5.0% $121.63 
2012 17.3% 7.5% $183.61 
2013 17.4% 10.0% $247.33 
2014 17.2% 10.0% $248.18 
2015 16.9% 10.0% $250.89 
2016 16.5% 10.0% $246.60 
Iowa 
2005 13.2% 6.5% $133.15 
2006 13.2% 6.5% $135.29 
2007 12.6% 7.0% $142.69 
2008 13.7% 7.0% $144.38 
2009 15.6% 7.0% $155.48 
2010 15.3% 7.0% $152.88 
2011 15.2% 7.0% $151.57 
2012 15.2% 7.0% $152.97 
2013 15.3% 14.0% $311.16 
2014 15.0% 15.0% $334.98 
2015 14.8% 15.0% $341.55 
2016 14.4% 15.0% $337.65 
Kansas 
2005 14.6% 15.0% $325.01 
2006 14.2% 15.0% $326.73 
2007 14.0% 17.0% $361.14 
2008 14.7% 17.0% $362.03 
2009 16.8% 17.0% $396.45 
2010 16.9% 18.0% $413.76 
2011 16.9% 18.0% $411.70 
2012 16.7% 18.0% $415.22 
2013 16.9% 17.0% $398.53 
2014 16.6% 17.0% $398.80 
2015 16.2% 17.0% $405.86 
2016 16.0% 17.0% $398.82 
Louisiana 
2005 27.9%   
2006 26.9%   
2007 24.5%   
2008 26.1% 3.5% $92.56 
2009 28.1% 3.5% $98.61 
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2010 27.6% 3.5% $96.71 
2011 27.3% 3.5% $95.81 
2012 26.9% 3.5% $96.20 
2013 27.0% 3.5% $97.07 
2014 26.6% 3.5% $97.34 
2015 26.6% 3.5% $99.19 
2016 26.4% 3.5% $97.83 
Maine 
2005 14.3% 4.9% $98.85 
2006 14.2% 5.0% $101.29 
2007 13.2% 5.0% $98.56 
2008 15.0% 5.0% $98.04 
2009 16.9% 4.0% $83.28 
2010 16.8% 4.0% $81.84 
2011 16.7% 5.0% $100.89 
2012 16.7% 5.0% $101.94 
2013 16.8% 5.0% $103.29 
2014 16.7% 5.0% $103.14 
2015 16.3% 5.0% $104.43 
2016 15.8% 5.0% $102.80 
Maryland 
2005 13.2% 50.0% $1,085.21 
2006 13.0% 50.0% $1,099.39 
2007 12.7% 50.0% $1,079.00 
2008 13.5% 50.0% $1,074.84 
2009 14.8% 50.0% $1,163.24 
2010 14.8% 50.0% $1,149.87 
2011 14.9% 50.0% $1,143.60 
2012 14.9% 50.0% $1,146.06 
2013 15.0% 50.0% $1,159.77 
2014 15.2% 50.0% $1,158.21 
2015 14.8% 50.0% $1,169.90 
2016 14.3% 50.0% $1,144.00 
Massachusetts 
2005 10.4% 15.0% $299.14 
2006 10.4% 15.0% $301.70 
2007 10.1% 15.0% $296.03 
2008 11.0% 15.0% $295.47 
2009 12.3% 15.0% $315.00 
2010 12.3% 15.0% $309.89 
2011 12.5% 15.0% $306.99 
2012 12.7% 15.0% $307.54 
2013 12.9% 15.0% $312.02 
2014 12.8% 15.0% $311.24 
2015 12.4% 15.0% $313.90 
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2016 12.0% 15.0% $310.20 
Michigan 
2005 14.9%   
2006 15.1%   
2007 14.9%   
2008 16.4% 10.0% $224.91 
2009 18.4% 20.0% $483.46 
2010 18.4% 20.0% $474.73 
2011 18.4% 20.0% $474.76 
2012 18.3% 6.0% $144.25 
2013 18.4% 6.0% $145.36 
2014 18.0% 6.0% $146.35 
2015 17.5% 6.0% $148.41 
2016 17.0% 6.0% $146.76 
Nebraska 
2005 14.0%   
2006 13.9% 8.0% $173.68 
2007 13.4% 10.0% $211.62 
2008 14.3% 10.0% $212.17 
2009 16.2% 10.0% $229.40 
2010 16.1% 10.0% $226.78 
2011 16.1% 10.0% $225.41 
2012 16.0% 10.0% $227.96 
2013 16.1% 10.0% $231.13 
2014 15.7% 10.0% $231.95 
2015 15.4% 10.0% $235.70 
2016 15.0% 10.0% $232.60 
New Mexico 
2005 23.7%   
2006 22.6%   
2007 21.5% 8.0% $182.48 
2008 22.8% 10.0% $226.59 
2009 24.8% 10.0% $245.65 
2010 24.5% 10.0% $242.11 
2011 24.4% 10.0% $241.12 
2012 24.6% 10.0% $240.94 
2013 24.7% 10.0% $243.82 
2014 24.2% 10.0% $243.62 
2015 24.0% 10.0% $247.25 
2016 23.8% 10.0% $244.50 
North Carolina 
2005 20.3%   
2006 20.0%   
2007 18.7%   
2008 20.7% 3.5% $82.28 
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2009 22.5% 5.0% $125.85 
2010 22.2% 5.0% $124.25 
2011 22.2% 5.0% $123.34 
2012 22.2% 5.0% $123.93 
2013 22.4% 4.5% $112.13 
2014 22.2%   
2015 21.8%   
2016 21.0%   
Ohio 
2005 14.9%   
2006 15.1%   
2007 14.5%   
2008 16.1%   
2009 18.1%   
2010 18.0%   
2011 18.0%   
2012 17.8%   
2013 18.0% 5.0% $120.26 
2014 17.7% 10.0% $240.67 
2015 17.4% 10.0% $244.51 
2016 17.1% 10.0% $240.70 
Oklahoma 
2005 21.3% 5.0% $117.27 
2006 20.6% 5.0% $118.22 
2007 18.8% 5.0% $114.86 
2008 20.5% 5.0% $114.19 
2009 22.9% 5.0% $124.68 
2010 22.6% 5.0% $123.43 
2011 22.2% 5.0% $122.49 
2012 21.6% 5.0% $122.83 
2013 21.8% 5.0% $124.08 
2014 21.2% 5.0% $124.45 
2015 21.4% 5.0% $126.66 
2016 21.4% 5.0% $125.85 
Oregon 
2005 14.1% 5.0% $103.78 
2006 13.9% 5.0% $103.77 
2007 13.3% 5.0% $100.82 
2008 14.7% 6.0% $120.20 
2009 16.6% 6.0% $129.36 
2010 16.5% 6.0% $126.73 
2011 16.6% 6.0% $125.68 
2012 16.5% 6.0% $125.90 
2013 16.6% 6.0% $127.41 
2014 16.3% 8.0% $168.19 
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X.  
 
 
2015 15.7% 8.0% $169.52 
2016 15.0% 8.0% $167.12 
Vermont 
2005 12.5% 32.0% $604.27 
2006 12.3% 32.0% $604.14 
2007 12.0% 32.0% $588.83 
2008 13.2% 32.0% $582.42 
2009 14.7% 32.0% $629.30 
2010 14.7% 32.0% $614.15 
2011 14.7% 32.0% $603.59 
2012 14.7% 32.0% $607.49 
2013 14.7% 32.0% $616.45 
2014 14.4% 32.0% $614.63 
2015 14.1% 32.0% $623.94 
2016 13.7% 32.0% $616.32 
Virginia 
2005 14.2%   
2006 14.1% 20.0% $447.74 
2007 13.6% 20.0% $437.40 
2008 14.8% 20.0% $435.30 
2009 16.4% 20.0% $467.99 
2010 16.5% 20.0% $462.38 
2011 16.4% 20.0% $457.87 
2012 16.4% 20.0% $461.15 
2013 16.7% 20.0% $464.32 
2014 16.6% 20.0% $461.26 
2015 16.3% 20.0% $467.55 
2016 15.9% 20.0% $460.60 
